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HE ADMINISTRATION recently presented its
national economic plan for the eighteen-month period
ending June 30, 1974. The Administration’s plan is
contained in three documents — the Federal Budget,
the Economic Report of the President, and The An-
nual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers.’ In-
cluded in the economic plan is (1) a proposed pro-
gram for the Federal budget, (2) goals for gross na-
tional product (GNP), output, prices, and employ-
ment, and (3) general recommendations for monetary
actions by the Federal Reserve System.
The goals for the U.S. economy in the months ahead
are stated most explicitly in the 1973 CEA Report.’
The goals include~a 10 percent advance in GNP from
calendar 1972 to 1973 (9 percent from fourth quarter
1972 to fourth quarter 1973); a reduction in the an-
nual rate of inflation, as measured by the consumer
price index, to abont 2,5 percent by the end of 1973;
and a reduction of unemployment to about 4,5 per-
cent of the labor force by the end of the year.
Proposed as consistent with the achievement of the
10 percent increase in GNP from 1972 to 1973 is a
Federal budget program consisting of an expenditure
increase (on a national income accounts basis) of 92
percent from calendar 1972 to 1973, and an increase
in the average tax rate because of previously legis-
lated social security tax changes. Though the Admin-
istration is vague in its recommendation for monetary
policy, the CEA does indicate that their target for
GNP
is likely to reqsnre a slower increase of the supply of
money and credit than was proper when the main
objective was to enconrage a quickened economic ex-
pansion in an environment of substantial unused
resources.3
This article summarizes and evaluates the Admin-
istration’s economic plan. First, as background, last
~The Budget of the United State.s Government, Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1974 (Government Printing Office, 1973),
and Economic Report of the President, together with The
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1973).










year’s plan is compared with the record of achieve-
ment. Second, the proposed Federal budget program
is presented in some detail, along with some discus-
sion of monetary policy recommendations. Third, the
economic plan is evaluated in terms of feasibility and
internal consistency. To aid in this evaluation, alter-
native projections with the St. Louis model are pre-
sented as a basis for comparison.
1972- ECQNOMIC P1.,AN IN IIETBOSFECT
In early 1972 the U.S. economy was still in the
process of adjusting to the major policy changes which
were implemented on August 15, 1971. At that time,
convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve
assets was suspended, a surcharge was imposed on
imports, the Federal excise tax was removed on auto-
mobiles, and a system of mandatory price-wage con-
trols was introduced, Then in early 1972, the Admin-
istration took additional actions which reflected some
doubts at that time about the strength of economic
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fiscal program to be accompanied by an accommoda-
tive monetary policy.
The following section summarizes the economic
record for 1972 and compares that record with the
Administration’s goals. The record indicates that the
Administration’s overall goals came very close to be-
ing realized.
Lcon-c’-m-rc (-2~c is-v-s. Eeal-iz,at-ki-ns
The CEA’s Report of a year ago projected an in-
crease in GNP of 9.4 percent from 1971 to 1972. The
realized increase was 9.7 percent. This error of 0.3
percent was the smallest for the CEA since 1964 and
well below the average absolute error of 1.2 percent
for CEA forecasts over the past eleven year’.
Tabfe I




1962 94; 6.7° 2.7’.
1963 4.4 5.4 1.0
1964 6.5 6.6 0.1
1965 6.1 7.5 1.4
1966 6.9 8.6 1.7
1967 6.4 5.6 0.8
1968 7.8 9.0 .2
1969 7.0 7.7 ‘ 0.7
1970 5.7 49 0.8
1971 9.0 7.5 I 5
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To further assess the accuracy of the Administra-
tion’s 1972 projection for GNP, an analysis by com-
ponents is presented in Table II. The CEA displayed
uncanny accuracy on the GNP total, but, typically,
this accuracy consisted of offsetting errors among the
components. Estimates of the increases in personal
consumption and Federal purchases were very accur-
ate, but the increase in fixed investment — that is, busi-
ness fixed investment plus residential construction —
was underestimated by about $11 billion. This under’
estimate was largely offset by overestimates of inven-
tory accumulation, state and local government pur-
chases, and net exports. The error in projecting in-
ventory accumulation may have been attributable, in
part, to the underestimation of fixed investment. The
overestimation of state and local purchases related to
the timing of the revenue sharing program, but the
error in estimating net exports was simply a miscal-
culation of the impact of changes in international
economic arrangements in late 1971.
The relatively accurate projection of total GNP car-
ried through to projections of output, prices and un-
employment (Table III) - The CEA projected an in-
crease of 5.9 percent in output, \vhich actually grew
at a more rapid 6.5 percent rate. Prices were pro-
jected to increase 3.2 percent; the actual increase was
3 percent. Unemployment was expected to average
5.6 percent in 1972, declining from 6 percent in late
1971 to about 5 percent late in the year. The actual
unemployment rate followed this projected pattern
almost perfectly, and did in fact average 5.6 percent
for the year.
Table If
Projected ard Actual Changes in
Economic Activity: 1971 to 1972
CEA
Projection Acluaf Er’ar
GNP 9.4 9.7 0.3
Output 59 65 06
Prices 3 2 3.0 02
tinenpfa~’ment Rate 56 5.6 0.0
Table 1
Projected and Acfuol Changes in GNP
and Components: 1971 to 1972
(Bflfians of Dollars)
CEA
P’ajectian £ Acfuai~ Error
Personal Consumption 553.0 $ 56.2 $ - 3.2
Be..ssness Fixed tnvestment 8.7 14.6 - 5.9
Business Inventories 5.9 2.2 3.7
Residential Construction 6.1 11 3 5.2
Federal Purchases 8.8 8 1 0.7
Slate and Local Purcf-.a3es 96.2 93.9 2.3
Net Exports 0.5 4.8 $ 4,3
GNP 598.2 $101.7
i:’t.s,s.sp.,I j,, Ii’s’ s;:LsI. ‘. .—of “‘s 1:1:.: 1 ii_\ up’ ‘I.
5rI.I.,sne’~:) is_sue, irse, .‘(L.’tJ~ejs,~.
In summary, the CEA was very accurate in its
prognosis of the course of the major economic aggre-
gates for 1972. GNP. output, prices, arid unemploy-
snent generally moved in accordance with the CEA
targets. The projected change in total GNP was, for
practical purposes, realized, but consisted of offsetting
errors in the individual components of CNP.
J’i.slfls ~‘ft,
Assessment of the accuracy of any economic fore-
cast depends on more than just a comparison of real-
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ized and projected values of CNP, output, and prices.
A more complete evaluation also takes into account a
comparison of policy plans with policy realizations. In
other words, was the projection realized because of
realized policy plans, or in spite of discrepancies be-
tween policy plans and realizations? This section
compares the record of monetary-fiscal policy
actions in 1972 with the original programs and
recommendations.
Federal budget plans are compared with realiza-
tions in Table JV. Examination of NIA receipts and
expenditures indicates that there was a substantial
underestimate of receipts and a small overestimate of
expenditures. The error in both of these estimates
worked in the direction of making the realized deficit
smaller than projected. Since receipts projections de-
pend mainly on the forecast of CNP, it is surprising,
given the accuracy of the GNP forecast, that the re-
ceipts estimate was so far off the mark. The reason,
of course, was that the CEA did not forecast the ex-
tent of ovenvithholding of personal income taxes. Ad-
justment for this unexpected high flow of receipts
indicates that the basic receipts estimate was much
closer to realization, though still underestimated. U.S.
Treasury estimates of the amount of overwithholding
are in the neighborhood of $9 billion, so the economic
expansion and its greater-than-expected effect on re-
ceipts resulted in an error of about $4 billion in the
estimate of receipts.4
On the expenditure side, the estimate was quite
close, considering the magnitude of the increase
which was planned. Furthermore, the error was attrib-
utable primarily to the delayed enactment of the
revenue sharing program.
When the errors for receipts and expenditures are
combined, they show that the NIA deficit was over-
estimated by almost $16 billion. In general, these
errors were of the type that suggest that the fiscal
stimulus was not nearly as large as originally planned.
However, examination of the NIA budget does not
reveal the extent to which the budget was reflecting
an underestimate of the strength of economic
expansion.
To determine more accurately the extent of fiscal
stimulus which occurred, the high-employment bud-
get serves as a more appropriate, though still approxi-
mate. measure. By tIns measure, receipts were under-
estimated by only $4 billion. This error indicates there
Charles A’ Waite and Joseph C. Wakefield, ‘Federal Fiscal
Programs,” Survey of Current Business (February 1973),
p. 20.
Table IV





NIle. Recefpls $ 163 $ 29.2 $ 12.9
NIA Expenditures 29 0 26.0 3.0
MR Surplus or Defi it $ 12.8 $ +3-2 $ 15.9
High-Employment Receipts $ 13.8 $ 17.8 $ 40
High-Empf oyment
Expendttures 29.5 26 4 3.1
High Employment Surplus
or Deficft $—157 $ 85 $ 7.2
No E t mat of Is’ h-cruel men re ‘p do not includ U,
if et 0 ove wsthhofdm p ‘ On ineomn ‘cc
was a miscalculation of the economic stimulus related
to the Revcnue Act of 1971 and the continuing effects
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. On the other hand
the estimate of high-employment expenditures was in
error by about the same amount as for MA
expenditures.
As a result, exanunation of the change in the high-
employment deficit indicates that the fiscal stimulus
was about $7 billion less than planned. Despite the
stimulus being less than planned, GNP grew slightly
faster than projected.
Consider now monetary actions as a part of the
overall eeononuc plan for 1972. The Administration
(lid not indicate a specific growth rate for money;
however, they did emphasize that monetary policy
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.An-aiysi-s IDsed on St. Lon-zs Model
In general, the CEA projections proved to be very
accurate, though the reasons why they were accurate
are not clear. For purposes of comparison, some alter-
native simulations with the St. Louis model were
conducted. Such simulations shed little direct light
on the CEA projections, yet they provide a systematic
basis for evaluating the 1972 economic experience.
Two projections of the St. Louis model are shown
in Table V. The first projection uses money and high-
employment expenditures as they occurred in 1972.
The second projection is the result of using money
and high-employment expenditures as recommended
in the Adniinistration’s economic plan in January
1972.~The first projection using actual movements of
the two key policy variables indicates that, after the
fact, the St. Louis model estimated the increase in
GNP to be $90.1 billion. The second projection indi-
cates that movements of the policy variables in line
with Administrative recommendations would have in-
creased CNP by $92.9 billion. Comparison of the pro-
jections indicates that the total impact of realized
5
After the fact, a growth of money at a 7 percent rate was
deemed consistent with the CEA forecast for 1972. This 7
percent rate was the average of two alternatives consid-
ered in an evaluation of the 1972 economic plan in this
Review. See Keith M. Carlson, “The 1972 National Economic
Plan: An Experiment in Fiscal Activism,” this Review (March
1972), pp. 3-10.
policy actions turned out to be less than if
the initial policy recommendations had been
realized. Nevertheless, it is clear that the St.
Louis model underestimated the momentum
of the economy in 1972, which, when viewed
within the framework of the St. Louis model,
translates into an underestimation of the
growth in the income velocity of money.
POLICY PLANS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1975
Though the projections of the broad economic ag-
gregates are very similar to actual experience in 1972,
there are some differences in the composition of GNP
(Table VI). The most notable differences are with
reference to business inventories, residential construc-
tion, net exports, and Federal purchases. Business in-
ventory accumulation is projected to be much stronger
in 1973 than in 1972, while residential construction is
expected to slow considerably compared to the very
rapid 1972 advance. Net exports are projected to show
a smaller deficit, though it should be noted that the
CEA projections were released before the U.S. de-
valued the dollar on February 12. Federal purchases
are projected to show little change in 1973, in con-
trast to the \ percent increase in 1972.
Table VI
Projected Changes in GNP and Components:
1972 ond 1973
1972~ , 1973~ -
Bilfians Bilfions
of Dollars Percent of Dotlars Percent
Personaf Consumption $ 36.2 8.6’ $ 68.9 9.5’
Business Fixed
Investment 14.6 I3.8 16 6 13.8
Business Inventories 2.2 —.. ‘ 67
Residential Construction 11.3 26.5 1.6 3.0
Federal Purchases 8.1 8.3 0.6 0.6
Slate and Local Purchases 93.9 10.3 18.1 12.2
Net Exports 4.8 - -.— 2.6 —
GNP $101.7 9.7-1 5114.9 io.on-
seeu!,ss,:ss;s,, .~:sT:e fl iIst’ U’Tl rE’s f.,jeort.
r:.:ins.tr.elbyst’.. If”,’’—.’u’sii’’s.c’i,,a I!i’SCli:\ lte,si,.t.
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Table V
Projected Changes in Spending, Output, Prices,
and Unemployment: 1971 to 1972
ONP linem- ployment
(Billions) Output Prices Rote
CEA Projection (1/24/72) $ 98.2 9.4” 5.93’ 3.2 - 5.6s
Actuat 101.7 9.7 6.5 3.0 3.6
SI. Louis Model Proiections
Changes in money and
Federal spending as
actuafy acc..’rrod 90.1 8.6 4.6 4.1 5.9
Changes in money and
Federal spending
cansistent with ~EA
assurnptians of 1/24, 72 92.9 8.8 4.6 4.1 5.8
Ncr St I.e,~ern’3’.’lJ,.’e.t’r’.:.c:es,’ Sr. ‘el a,, fats’ ws::L a .zhr.n’tlsrirrs.s
estimated hem data through Ill s (C:. II, c’I’ths’ of trie:ce r,g r’’I.pi’si’rr.tiore,e.
UI 117’.’ i— nt’s
1
sc :—‘~,r...,e’’l,es:, ljne.t. _%la.. tFr—r 5.re’_st’:le”’ Fee cent
iLlea~th5.L,. I,.i’le~’’,c,.—ei’t.’ rslf’ser’. ‘ii :ersstu’Lgc t~.,r.t’..l
The Administration has projected a 10
percent increase in GNP for 1973. This GNP
projection is offered as being consistent with
about a 4.7 percent target for unemploy-
ment for the year (4.5 percent by year end)
and a3percent rate of inflation for the year
7.4 percent from fourth quarter 1971 to fourth quarter (2.5 percent by year end) - These projections repre-
1972, indicating that, relative to past experience, sent a continuation of the progress made in 1972 in
monetary actions were very expansive. The 1972 reducing both unemployment and inflation.
growth of money was faster than 92 percent of all
previous years from 1947 to the present.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
tethrrat. Budget Prograin ~o•r Calendar 1975
The budget plan for calendar 1973 calls for no
further fiscal stimulus from calendar 1972. The high-
employment budget, as estimated by this Bank, is
projected to be in deficit by about $7 billion in calen-
dar 1973, which compares with a $6 billion deficit in
1972 and a $3 billion surplus in 1971. The budget
plan calls for a reduction in this deficit during the
year, with an $11 billion annual rate of deficit in the
first half and a $4 billion rate of deficit in the second
half.
Lvprnthtares — The budget program indicates a
$23 bfflion increase, or 9.3 percent, in Federal expen-
ditures on an NIA basis for calendar 1973 (Table
VII). This compares with an 11.8 percent advance in
1972 and a 6.8 percent average rate of increase from
1968 to 1971.
Defense spending is projected to decline in 1973 by
1.8 percent, compared to a 6.7 percent increase in
1972. However, defense spending is projected to ad-
vance 1.1 percent from the second half of 1972 to the
second half of 1973. The effect of cessation of Vietnam
hostilities has already occurred as defense spending
declined at a 3 percent average annual rate from 1968
to 1971, after increasing at a 16 percent average rate
from 1965 to 1968.
Nondefense spending, according to the Adminis-
tration’s budget, is projected to advance 14.2 percent
in 1973, the same rate of increase as in 1972, and in
line with the 13 percent average rate of increase from
1965 to 1971. As with defense spending, year-to-year
comparisons are misleading, because nondefense
spending is projected to increase at a 2 percent an-
nual rate from the first half 1973 to the second half
of 1973. Nondefense spending in the first half of 1973
reflects the temporary effects of retroactive revenue
sharing, the continuing effects of a permanent in-
crease in social security benefits, and a $2.2 billion pay
increase for government employees.
Receipts — Federal receipts on an NIA basis are
projected to rise by $19 billion in 1973, or by 8.4 per-
cent. By comparison, receipts rose by 15 percent in
1972. These year-to-year comparisons are influenced
in considerable measure by the effects of the over-
withholding of personal income taxes in 1972.
To identify more precisely the basic trends for re-
ceipts, the sources of change are shown in Table VII.
The only major tax change is the increase in the social
security tax rate from 10.4 to 11.7 percent, effective
January 1, 1973, and the expansion of the base for
social security taxes from $9,000 to $10,800. The rise
MARCH 1973
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Table Vtl
Planned Changes in Federal (NIA) Budget:
1972 to 1973
Billions of Daffa’s)
NIA Receipts $1 9I
change due to qrowth 174
Change due to cycle 8 2
Change doe Ca tax rate ad~usIments “ 75
NIA Expenditures $ 23.0
Change in defense ---1.3
Chance en nondetcnse 24.3
NIA Surplus or Deficit 4.0
H:gh.Ereployinent Receipts $ 23.6
High-Employment Expenditures $ 24.7
FEgh.Emplayeient Surplus or Deficit $ 1.1
•Es’ine:e,’’i jy (hi.’ 11e.s>t ‘re.si ill’ ir’ets’ns~Bu’lgs’f f’’r tl,rrsi ‘975.
Surpius/Refkit position — The combined effect of
rising expenditures and receipts is a slight increase in
the NIA deficit by $4 billion, from $18.5 billion in
1972 to $22.5 billion in 1973. However, since the NIA
budget is influenced by the projected pace of ceo-
Federal Government Expenditures
ttaii,ssi ieccmc Accesses tedeci
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nomic activity, a more accurate indication of the eco-
nomic impact of the budget can be obtained by ex-
amining the high-employment budget. Even on this
basis, the estimate of the economic impact of the
budget program is very approximate.
On a high-employment basis, the NIA budget is
projected to be in deficit by $7 billion in 1973. The
plan of the Administration is to have the high-em-
ployment budget moving toward a surplus position
by early 1974. This plan is predicated on the assump-
tion that inflationary pressures will be developing in
1973 and a movement in the direction of fiscal re-
straint will be necessary to combat these pressures.
This budget strategy stands in marked contrast to
1972 when a large fiscal stimulus was planned to ac-
celerate economic expansion.
Monetary Policy Beeomnsendations
The Administration’s overall economic plan is fo-
cused on the Federal budget, with very little mention
of the role for monetary actions. The Economic Re-
port of the President, for example, makes no men-
tion of monetary pohcy. Furthermore, the 1973 CEA
Report, in contrast to recent past reports, placed little
emphasis on monetary actions, either with reference
to their role in the 1972 expansion or in terms of
recommendations for 1973. Monetary actions in 1972
were summarized simply as “accommodating” with
respect to the financial requirements of last year’s
expansion.
The role for monetary policy in 1973 is summarized
by the CEA as follows:
A gradual slowing of the expansion of money- C~~P
to a steady rate consistent with the long-run poten-
tial growth rate of the economy and reasonable price
stability is also an appropriate goal for monetary
policy. This is likely- to require a slower increase of
the supply of money and credit. ,,
EVALUATION OF 1973
ECONOMIC PEA/F
The Administration’s projection for 1973 is very
close to the consensus of other forecasts. For purposes
of comparison, the CEA projections are evaluated
with reference to the St. Louis model. This section
focuses on two considerations: (1) Is the projected
increase in total spending consistent with the pro-
posed set of stabilization policies, and (2) are the
price and unemployment goals consistent with the
projected increase in total spending?
611973 CEA Report, p. 75.
Feasibility of Total. Spending Goal.
To detennine the feasibility of the Administration’s
projection of a $115 billion, or 10 percent, increase in
GNP, two combinations of policies were conducted
with the St. Louis model. These combinations of
policies are:
(1) increases of Federal spending as proposed in
the budget and an expansion of money at a
steady 6 percent annual rate from fourth quar-
ter 1972;~
(2) increases of Federal spending as proposed in the
budget and an expansion of money at a steady
8 percent annual rate from fourth quarter 1972.
The two alternatives for money growth represent
two illustrative courses of monetary action, It should
be emphasized that they are illustrative and in no
way directly attributable to the CEA or the Federal
Reserve System. The steady 6 percent path of money
growth is presented as being consistent with the rec-
ommendation of the CEA, at least in direction if not
7
The assumed path for Federal spending reflects special con-
siderations which are necessary to assess the economic impact
of fiscal actions within the framework of the St. Louis model.
The impact of fiscal actions on CNP in the St. Louis model
works only through a dircct etlect on GNP. As a result, large
variations in Federal expenditures tend to introduce distor-
tions in the results because the sample period used for esti-
mation of the coefficients is relatively free of such variations.
And even to the extent such variations are evident in past
experience, the process of estimating regression coefficients is
itself an averaging process. More specifically, the rise in ex-
penditures in the fourth quarter of 1972 was attributable in
large measure ts, retroactive revenue sharing. Information re—
lating to the special nature of this expenditure iaerease was
used to introduce a judgmental element into the model inputs
so as to reduce distortions in the outputs of the model.
Fiscal Measures
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U.s. D,yc,U,,yFcf
1cyUr7d—,Si,s,,,cccth&sl. Ccci,
dclcplcle,th! 45 7cc_I_I 1712. d77b75Ii,cildiccbs hcIf.ycc, ,clicc’cc by Sic (cyk bcccd
c,tb,5ccc117741_dy,ci (ccigclc,Ii’hclllcAyyccIRspcIIc{Ih, Cccc,cil
Page 7FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1973
Table VIII
Projected Changes in Total GNP:
1973 and 1974
1973 1974
Bilteons Increase Billion, Increase
cEA Praject.an
(1/31/73) $114.9 100~ $ —
St. Louis Model Proiection




1974 budget 111.9 9.7 85.3 68




1974 budget 119.2 10.3 iaa.s 8.6
in precise magnitude. The steady 8 percent money
path would represent an approximate continuation of
the course of monetary actions in 1972.
The results for these combinations of policies are
shown in Table VIII. The combination of a steady 6
percent growth of money and government spending
based on the fiscal 1974 budget yields results which
are roughly consistent with the CEA projections. The
conclusion is offered here that the CEA projection is
indeed feasible if the impact of retroactive revenue
sharing is distributed more evenly over time than the
NIA expenditure estimates would indicate.
The case with steady 8 percent money growth is
shown for illustration. If money should grow at n
rapid 8 percent rate, the St. Louis model indicates
that GNP would increase by about $5 billion more
than the CEA forecasts. Furthermore, it should be
remembered that the St. Louis model contains an
implicit assumption that velocity will grow at a rela-
tively slow rate in the range of 2.2 to 2S percent
from 1972 to 1973.
In summary, the CEA projection appears to be
feasible and realistic. There is a definite possibility,
however, that the expansion of nominal GNP will be
stronger than planned if (1) money grows faster than
at a6percent rate, (2) velocity increases more rap-
idly, or (3) some combination of the two.
inspilcations of Total Spendin.g Goal
Aside from the possibility of attaining the CNP
goal, attention is now focused on the Administration’s
price and unemployment goals. Table IX, on the fol-
lowing page, shows the implied paths of output, prices
and unemployment as given by the St. Louis model
using an estimated path for GNP consistent with the
CEA forecast. There are two St. Louis model projec-
Examination of the table indicates the critical im-
portance of the assumption about the success of Phase
III of the price-wage control program, as well as the
lasting effects of the earlier phases of the program.
The two alternatives reflect assumptions about these
lasting effects, The first St. Louis model projection
assumes that past controls were effective in perma-
nently reducing the price level from what it otherwise
would have been, and that the 1973 price-unemploy-
ment mix will be determined within that context. The
other alternative assumes that price-wage controls
were not effective in permanently reducing the price
level, and prices will thus show a catch-up effect
toward the basic trend as detennined by monetary-
fiscal actions during the period of controls,
Examination of these alternatives indicates that the
Administration’s forecast is roughly consistent with
the “effectiveness of controls” version of the St. Louis
model. With this version of the model, prices are pro-
jected to rise 3.3 percent in 1973, only slightly higher
than that projected by the CEA, Unemployment is
projected to average 4.7 percent, about the same as
the Administration’s projection.
Consider now the “ineffectiveness of controls” ver-
sion of the St. Louis model. This model shows a rapid
run-up in prices in 1973, which illustrates the assump-
tion that prices will reflect a level consistent with the
longer-run path of monetary growth. In other words,
the assumption underlying this version of the model is
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tions which reflect different assumptions about the
longer-run effects of the price-wage control program.
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Table IX
Projected Charges in GNP, Output, Prices, and Unemployment: 1973 and 1974
(Percent)
1973 1974
Is II IV ‘Tecr I II III IV ye
0
,
CEA Projecffans (1 “31.73):
GNP 10.5 9.8 8.5 8.0 10.0 —— - . -- ——
Output 6.0 6.3 5.4 5.2 6.8 ...- —
Prices 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 —. .-.- —— —
Unemployment Rate 50 4.8 4.6 45 4.7 __. —. .._ — —
St Louis Model Prajections:
(1) With CEA ONP and
Ca ntrols effectiveness
GNP 10.5 9.8 8.5 8.0 10.0 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.2
Output 6.4 5.9 4.8 4.4 6.5 4.4 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.6
Prices 3.9 3.8 36 35 3.2 34 3.3 3.2 31 3.5
Unemployment Rate 8.9 4.7 46 4.6 47 46 4.6 4.5 4.5 46
(2) With CEA GNP and
controls ineffectiveness
GNP lOS 9.8 8.5 8.0 10.0 80 8.0 7.8 7.8 8.1
Output 5.0 4.5 3.7 3.4 5.7 38 3.1 4.0 4.3 3.8
Prices 5,3 5.2 47 45 41 41 4.1 3.7 3.3 4.1
Unemployment Rate 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1
Iolstzcr run. ‘I Isis pus—titular vcI~,iss1I ol the suodel as— stulluIu~ mssdcr,stiistz during List’ e,tr. At thu ‘,.(lIlt’
“itrues that fiji’, C.tts.’hl’1.1
1
) ~3t0t’C’,s WII take t~Vsi \‘S’.ll’S, Li It tile AdllIIlli’tr,LI,i(1II ICel,flilliClLd’ .L ¼Iifl~Ili~ in
thiosii~hiIleis I’. ,us ,trlsiti’ar~.LS~5(llil3lRJll.( ;i\’eli titi’ \r3’ tIioIIs’t,(J’\ gI’ciu thi ll’le:u tile’ I’.ipiil 7.-i l5~’1’t’5’ lit ,id~ ,(lli.’c
,,iou 01’ tlis’ iiisdt’i a~etiii.’, assi.nnptions. the OutlOok Isis’ III 972.
Illiplo) nt’iit IS SOIl VU hat lc~soptinsi.~tie¼IlO\~ 114 all
~t’~’sitgr Itllt’llil5IO\uII’lit lists’ ol i.~)prlcs’lit 1(31’ 197$.
Assessment of the Administration’s goals for prices
and unemployment is much more difficult. Due to the
uncertainty that still exists as to the lasting effects of
the price-wage control program, as it has been ad-
ministered up to this time, achievement of these goals
is much more tenuous. A version of the St. Louis
model, which builds in the assumption of past suc-
cess of price-wage controls, indicates that the Admin-
istration’s price-unemployment goals are attainable in
1973, given their assumptions about monetary-fiscal
actions, But any tendency towards a catching-up of
prices will delay the attaimnent of either the price or
the unemployment goal.
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Using the St. Louis model as an aid in evaluating
the 1973 econoniic plan, it was found that the total
spending goal was feasible, This goal for total spend-
ing leaves little margin for error, however, for any
one or a combination of several eventualities could
push CNP above the Administration’s goals. The GNP
goal requires that money growth does not exceed 6
percent, that Federal spending rises in line with pro-
jections, and that the income velocity of money in-
creases at a rate of about 3 percent. To the extent
that the income velocity of money rises at a more
rapid rate, the growth of the money stock would have
to be correspondingly slower.
Any conclusions about the attainability of the Ad-
ministration’s price-unemployment goals are very ten-
tative. In particular, it still remains to be determined
whether the price-wage control program has had any
lasting effects on price trends. Aside from such short-
run considerations, it is perhaps more certain that
monetary-fiscal actions over the next two years are
crucial in the determination of price trends beyond
1974. An awareness of these longer-rnn considerations
is demonstrated in the CEA Report, however, when
they suggest the urgency of getting the eeonomny on a
noninflationary growth path.
SUMMARY
The Administration has projected another year of
rapid growth in GNP. Accompanying this rapid
growth is a belief that unemployment will be reduced
further and inflation will continue to slow. Over the
longer run the CEA has made it clear that it seeks the
objective of slowing the pace of economic advance so
as to be consistent with noninflationary growth.
To achieve their objectives, the Administration pro-
poses a Federal budget program that maintains a
stimulative posture in 1973, but with the degree of